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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

WILL EVERYONE GET THEIR BEST MEDICINE? IMPLICATIONS FOR
OFF-LABEL USE OF PHARMACEUTICALS IN AN AMERICAN UNIVERSAL
HEALTHCARE REGIME

I. INTRODUCTION
Prescribing drugs for off-label uses has become a common practice
among physicians both in the United States and abroad.1 This is due in part
to pharmaceutical companies that illegally promote off-label uses to
doctors.2 The prevalence of lawsuits against such companies suggests that
large pharmaceutical companies prefer to suffer the consequences of
violating drug promotion laws rather than spend the money and time to
conduct clinical tests so that additional uses may be promoted legally.3 This
idea can be rationalized when one compares the cost of post-market clinical
tests and the short length of patent protections on certain drugs to the fact
that doctors maintain the freedom to prescribe any drug for its off-label
indications, and how drug companies can profit from this off-label use.4
Since it is arguable that doctors will continue to prescribe drugs for off-label
uses they find effective without any accompanying Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) approval, it is understandable why manufacturers will
continue to find ways around marketing prohibitions to get the word to
doctors about off-label indications of their products.
One important consideration is how the consistent use of off-label drugs
affects Medicare and Medicaid payment schemes. Both federal programs
will cover any drug use that has been approved by the FDA, and both will
cover off-label uses that have been reviewed in a variety of sources that

1. See generally Elizabeth A. Weeks, Is It Worth the Trouble? The New Policy on
Dissemination of Information on Off-Label Drug Use Under the Food and Drug Administration
Modernization Act of 1997, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 645 (1999) (discussing the prevalence of
off-label prescribing in the absence of FDA oversight of physician prescribing practices).
2. See generally id. (discussing the illegal promotion of off-label uses by pharmaceutical
manufacturers and the perceived benefits of promoting off-label uses).
3. Jonathan D. Rockoff, Improper Sales of Medicines Targeted Drug Firms Have Paid
Fines of $3.5 Billion Since 2001 for Wrongful Promotions, BALT. SUN, May 7, 2006, at 1A;
Sandra H. Johnson, Polluting Medical Judgment? False Assumptions in the Pursuit of False
Claims Regarding Off-Label Prescribing, 9 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 61, 67-68 (2008).
4. Johnson, supra note 3, at 69-71; see also Weeks, supra note 1, at 663 (discussing
the shorter patent life of secondary indications).
233
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make up the Congressional compendia.5 Beyond those drugs listed in the
Congressional compendia, however Medicare Part D and individual state
Medicaid programs tend to limit what kind of off-label uses they will pay
for.6 How these government funded programs deal with off-label
prescribing practices is important when predicting how the issue might be
handled in a universal healthcare system.
This note will discuss how Medicare and Medicaid handle the issue of
off-label prescribing, and will compare the United States’ current approach
with the approaches of two countries with universal health care coverage,
the United Kingdom and Switzerland. This note will also examine how the
United Kingdom and Switzerland reconcile the rising price of drugs with the
necessity of controlling costs. Based on these models, this note will analyze
how the off-label issue might be best handled if a universal health care
system were to be implemented in the United States. Any proposal for
universal healthcare in this country must consider the costs associated with
providing such a system. Ultimately, if it is decided that off-label use is
unnecessary or not cost-effective from the perspective of the insurer, it begs
the question whether patients who rely on off-label drugs to treat chronic
symptoms will be left by the wayside in an effort to provide everyone
“adequate” care.
This note will first discuss the nature of off-label use in the U.S. and
abroad, including the regulations pertinent to the approval and promotion
of pharmaceuticals. After establishing in Section II that off-label use is likely
to continue, Section III will then address the ways in which off-label drugs
prescribed by doctors are covered under the federally funded Medicare
insurance program and the federal and state funded Medicaid insurance
program. These approaches will then be compared to how drugs are
covered in U.K. and Switzerland. Section IV will consider several projected
plans for universal healthcare programs in the United States and, using the
Medicare and Medicaid models and the two European systems, will analyze
implications for coverage of off-label use in an American universal health
care scheme. Ultimately, this note concludes that the cost of off-label
prescribing may eventually outweigh patient need in any potential universal
healthcare regime.
II. OFF-LABEL USE OF PHARMACEUTICALS
Before considering different universal healthcare models, it is important
to establish a general understanding of off-label activity. Off-label use has
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(t)(2) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(k) (2000).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-102 (Supp. IV 2004); see, e.g., Edmonds v. Levine, 417 F. Supp.
2d 1323, 1327-31 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (case concerning Florida’s refusal to cover certain offlabel uses under its state funded Medicaid program).
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been defined as using a drug “for a purpose, in a higher or lower dose,
over a longer period of time, or for a population (such as children) different
from that for which the drug has been approved.”7 Off-label use also
includes “administering the drug in an unapproved method,”8 or using an
unapproved formulation.9 While promotion of off-label uses is strongly
regulated, doctors are free to prescribe drugs for unapproved uses, and
many commonly do.10 The practice of off-label prescribing is particularly
prevalent with cancer and HIV/AIDS patients, as well as in pediatrics, due to
the fact that most medicines for chronic diseases are approved for adults
only.11
A.

Off Label Use, Generally

The rationale supporting off-label use relates to the idea that many
patients are unable to wait for the FDA to approve a use of a drug that their
doctor has found to be effective to treat certain diseases.12 Off-label drug
use is also supported by the idea that the cost to drug companies to seek
approval of secondary indications of an already approved drug is too
high.13 On- or off-label, drug companies profit from the use of their drugs,
so there is very little incentive to undertake this time-consuming and costly
process.14 Additionally, since drug companies conduct clinical trials in
order to seek approval for universal distribution for the first indication of a
drug, the company may use a significantly more “conservative risk/benefit
calculus” than that used by an individual doctor assessing the needs of a
patient in order to expedite the approval process.15 In other words, the

7. Johnson, supra note 3, at 61.
8. Weeks, supra note 1, at 647; see also Sharon Conroy et al., Survey of Unlicensed
and Off Label Drug Use in Paediatric Wards in European Countries, 320 BRIT. MED. J. 79, 7980 (2000).
9. Conroy et al., supra note 8.
10. Weeks, supra note 1, at 647.
11. Weeks, supra note 1, at 647-48; see generally Rosemary Roberts et al., Pediatric
Drug Labeling: Improving the Safety and Efficacy of Pediatric Therapies, 290 JAMA 905, 905
(2003).
12. Katherine A. Helm, Note, Protecting Public Health from Outside the Physician’s
Office: A Century of FDA Regulation from Drug Safety Labeling to Off-Label Drug Promotion,
18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 117, 164 (2007).
13. See generally Johnson, supra note 3, at 69-71 (arguing that “the [federal] regulatory
structure incentivizes pharmaceutical firms to seek a narrow approved use, at least initially, in
order to minimize the delay to market and reduce the investment in research required to meet
FDA standards for approval.”).
14. Id. at 67-71 (noting that “the FDCA encourages the proliferation of off-label uses”
because once a drug is approved for a single purpose, it is available for physicians to
prescribe any way they see fit).
15. Weeks, supra note 1, at 659.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

236

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 2:233

doctor is generally in a far better position to determine whether an off-label
drug works for a particular patient. In fact, since the FDA considers the
practice of medicine exclusively within the realm of the physician, and
therefore out of its regulatory control, an off-label use that has proved
effective in the treatment of various conditions is commonly accepted as
standard practice by physicians.16 Some physicians even consider failure to
prescribe drugs for known effective off-label uses as a potential malpractice
liability.17
Conversely, there is substantial concern about the risk of adverse
reactions to off-label uses that are not scientifically validated by the FDA
approval process.18 A recent study found that while off-label use is relatively
common, some occurs without any evidence of “therapeutic efficacy.”19
That study also pointed out that while many off-label uses “represent a
logical extension of the FDA-approved indication,” some uses were
nevertheless “distinctively different from those for which the drug was
approved.”20 Even in situations where the drug is being used for the
approved indication, off-label prescribing is common among untested
populations, such as children, for whom the use of drugs only approved for
adults could potentially present significant dangers.21 This is a cause for
concern for policymakers as the primary goal of the FDA is patient
welfare.22

16. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 68 (discussing how an off-label use of a drug can
become the “customary standard of care” in certain circumstances, and noting that the FDA
lacks the authority to regulate the prescribing practices of health care practitioners).
17. Weeks, supra note 1, at 648; see generally Johnson, supra note 3, at 68 (stating
that, “[i]n fact, off-label use often becomes the customary standard of care in particular
circumstances, with the result that doctors are at risk for malpractice liability for failure to
prescribe an approved drug for an off-label use.”).
18. Weeks, supra note 1, at 658; David C. Radley et al., Off-Label Prescribing Among
Office-Based Physicians, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1021, 1021, 1025 (2006) (observing
that when off-label uses are similar to the approved indications, there is not much to be
concerned about, but that some off-label uses are “for indications distinctly different from
those for which the drug was approved”, which presents cause for concern over patient
safety); see also Valérie Junod, Information et publicité pour les médicaments s’adressant aux
Professionnells: les tribunaux Appliquent le droit de manière stricte, 88 BULLETIN DES MÉDECINS
SUISSES 1399, 1402 (2007) available at www.saez.ch/pdf_f/2007/2007-34/2007-34427.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2009) (discussing the dangers of doctors not being able to access
information on off-label uses of drugs they are prescribing).
19. Radley et al., supra note 18, at 1025.
20. Id. at 1025.
21. Johnson, supra note 3, at 82.
22. Weeks, supra note 1, at 658; see ENTERPRISE DIRECTORATE-GENERAL, EUROPEAN
COMM’N, PHARMACEUTICALS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 4, 8 (2000), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/pharmaceuticals/pharmacos/docs/brochure/brochurenov
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Off-Label Prescribing Practices in the United States

In the interest of patient safety, promotion of off-label uses was
prohibited entirely in the U.S. until 1997, when Congress passed the Food
and Drug Administration Modernization Act (FDAMA).23 FDAMA created a
small exception for the dissemination of information by manufacturers about
alternate uses of an already approved drug if that manufacturer was in the
process of conducting trials for the new use, or if that manufacturer had
already filed “a supplemental application to FDA for approval of the new
use.”24 This privilege is narrow, however, and subject to significant
restrictions.25 Among these restrictions are the rules that a manufacturer
may only disseminate information that is considered “scientifically sound,”
which can be demonstrated by publication in a peer-reviewed medical or
scientific journal, or similar reference publication.26 Additionally, such
information may only be disseminated to healthcare practitioners, pharmacy
benefit managers, health insurance issuers, group health plans, or federal or
state government agencies.27
Given the fact that companies must still conduct clinical testing and seek
approval from the FDA if they want to promote an off-label use, at least one
author argues that many companies will not take advantage of the
dissemination privilege granted by FDAMA.28 Clinical testing and approval
application is a long and expensive process, and if drug companies can
profit from the proliferation of off-label use of their products (through
physician experimentation and word of mouth, among other methods), there
may not be any incentive to seek approval for those off-label uses.29 From
the perspective of the pharmaceutical industry, obtaining FDA approval for

99.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2009) (discussing the similar goals of the European Union’s
equivalent to the FDA, the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products).
23. Food & Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA), Pub. L. No. 105115, § 401; see Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 102(a)(1), 76 Stat. 781 (1962); see generally Weeks,
supra note 1, at 653-54.
24. Weeks, supra note 1, at 650, 652; see 21 U.S.C § 360aaa(b)(1)(A) and (2000); see
also Mitchell Oates, Note, Facilitating Informed Medical Treatment Through Production and
Disclosure of Research into Off-Label Uses of Pharmaceuticals, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1272, 1284
(2005).
25. 21 C.F.R. § 99.1 (2008); see Weeks, supra note 1, at 650-51.
26. 21 C.F.R. § 99.101(a); see also Weeks, supra note 1, at 650-51.
27. 21 C.F.R. § 99.1(a)(2) (2008); see also Weeks, supra note 1, at 650.
28. See generally Weeks, supra note 1, at 662 (arguing that the threat of sanctions and
“the lack of additional economic incentives to seek FDA approval” will discourage companies
from participating in the new dissemination procedure when they can still profit from
“underground” promotion of off-label use of their drugs).
29. See id. at 663 (observing that “[m]anufacturers reap the economic benefits of
increased sales of their products whether they are prescribed on- or off-label.”).
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every possible use of a drug can be prohibitively expensive. 30 Currently,
once a drug is approved for a relatively narrow use, it can be released into
the market and off-label demand for it begins.31 Drug companies profit
from the proliferation of information among doctors for off-label uses, which
provides incentive from the market itself to not only approve drugs for very
narrow indications (that is, the path of least resistance), but to disseminate
information to doctors about off-label uses of their products by any means
possible.32
Further incentive for pharmaceutical companies to avoid conducting
clinical tests on additional uses presents itself when patent protection of a
drug does not last long enough to make such post-market testing
profitable.33 Obtaining FDA approval takes a significant amount of time,
thus making it impractical to obtain approval for every possible indication.34
Further, once allowed into the stream of commerce, both brand name and
generic drugs will be prescribed off-label.35 The fact that generic drugs are
also prescribed for off-label uses has significant implications for any federal
or state funded insurance program, where cutting costs it is important. This
desire to reduce costs may push insurers to cover only generic forms of
drugs. Thus, the incentives created for pharmaceutical companies by the
market, insurers, and the current regulatory framework would seem to push
those companies in the direction of promoting off-label use as a way of
maximizing profits.
The fact that many pharmaceutical companies are embroiled in
litigation related to the illegal promotion of off-label uses suggests that
regulations concerning off-label promotion have not been able to overcome
the financial incentives the marketplace has created for finding ways to
inform doctors about profitable off-label uses. 36 Off-label promotion is
generally not blatant, taking the form, for example, of providing doctors with
gifts, giving them discounts on certain drugs, discussions about off-label
uses behind closed doors, and other subtle, but improper, steps to provide
incentives for the doctor to prescribe a certain drug.37 Lawsuits filed against
drug companies for illegal promotion of off-label indications have resulted
30. See id. at 662 (noting that “manufacturers may find the expense and effort of seeking
new drug approval as a condition to dissemination of off-label information unjustified in
comparison to the potential value of the approval.”).
31. Helm, supra note 12.
32. Id.
33. Weeks, supra note 1, at 663.
34. Johnson, supra note 3, at 69-71 (discussing low regulatory incentives for
pharmaceutical companies to seek broad approval of new drugs).
35. Helm, supra note 12.
36. Rockoff, supra note 3.
37. Id.
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in those companies paying multi-million dollar settlements.38 Additionally,
the federal False Claims Act has been employed repeatedly in cases where
reimbursement by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) is
involved.39 The prevalence of litigation seems to indicate that, in terms of
influencing pharmaceutical company decisions, the market incentives to
engage in off-label promotion outweigh the penalties associated with
regulations that prohibit such activity.40 Even in cases where companies are
self-regulated (i.e. they have internal compliance programs to combat
illegal promotion activities), there is evidence that off-label promotion still
occurs with alarming frequency.41 Efforts at self-regulation have been
stepped up in recent months in light of the fact that drug companies
continue to face litigation for illegal marketing practices, but not enough
time has passed to determine if these measures will be effective at curbing
this behavior.42 As a report issued by Consumers International, a consumer
protection organization based in London, argues, “the sheer volume of
reported breaches indicates that even the companies with apparently the
most comprehensive compliance programmes are not fully effective in
preventing breaches of marketing codes. This problem extends to the
biggest companies, such as GSK [GlaxoSmithKline] and Pfizer.”43

38. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Will Pay $515 Million to Settle Pricing, Marketing
Allegations, 5 Pharmaceutical L. & Industry Rep. (BNA) No. 39, at 1028 (Oct. 5, 2007);
Company Admits Drug Misbranding, 5 Pharmaceutical L. & Industry Rep. (BNA) No. 29, at
746 (July 20, 2007); OxyContin Maker Will Pay $19.5 Million, Modify Marketing, in
Settlement with States, 5 Pharmaceutical L. & Industry Rep. (BNA) No. 19, at 486 (May 11,
2007); Cell Therapeutics to Pay $10.5 Million to Resolve Illegal Drug Marketing Charges, 5
Pharmaceutical L. & Industry Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at 410 (Apr. 20, 2007) (all discussing
settlements made by drug companies for violations of marketing laws).
39. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 101-17 (discussing the use of the FCA to garner a
settlement of $455 million over off-label use of the drug Neurontin).
40. See id. at 66 (noting that continued off-label prescribing suggests that litigation for
violations for seems to show the insignificance of the impact of such litigation).
41. Sarah Boseley, Kickbacks, Cartels and Chatrooms: How Unscrupulous Drug Firms
Woo the Public, THE GUARDIAN (London), June 26, 2006, at www.guardian.co.uk/society/
2006/jun/26/health.medicineandhealth1/print (last visited Jan. 3, 2009).
42. See Gardiner Harris, Drug Industry to Announce Revised Code on Marketing, N.Y.
TIMES, July 10, 2008, at C4 (discussing new voluntary guidelines established by the
pharmaceutical industry which ban giving doctors gifts as a promotional tool).
43. CONSUMERS INT’L, BRANDING THE CURE: A CONSUMER PERSPECTIVE ON CORPORATE
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, DRUG PROMOTION AND THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY IN EUROPE 26 -27
(June 2006) available at www.consumersinternational.org/Shared_ASP_Files/Uploaded
Files/ECD91B6F-FE37-45C0-AE34-898BFB39C700_BrandingtheCure-fullreport.pdf (last
visited Jan. 3, 2009).
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C. Off-Label Prescribing Practices in the United Kingdom
The Consumers International report demonstrates that illegal off-label
promotion practices are not isolated to the United States. Although
Europe’s regulatory structure seems more complicated than that of the
United States, the regulations are essentially the same.44 The European
Union (EU) established the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal
Products, commonly referred to as the European Medicines Evaluation
Agency (EMEA), which has roughly the same responsibilities as the FDA, but
at a supranational level.45 However, EMEA approval is not the only way a
drug can be approved for use in the EU. National regulatory agencies can
also approve drugs for use and then go through an application to have the
approval mutually recognized by other Member States.46 Nevertheless, a
Union-wide Directive issued by the Parliament and the Council of the
European Union states that “Member States shall prohibit any advertising of
a medicinal product in respect of which a marketing authorization has not
been granted in accordance with Community law.”47 This Directive is
bolstered by international trade associations that establish self-regulation
mechanisms for member pharmaceutical companies which restrict
promotion of non-approved drug uses.48
As a member of the European Union, the United Kingdom (U.K.) is
subject to the oversight of the EMEA.49 There is a significant amount of offlabel use in the U.K. just as there is in the United States, particularly in
pediatric medicine.50 In the U.K., such practice is commonly referred to as

44. Compare Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6
November 2001 on the Community Code Relating to Medicinal Products for Human Use,
2001 O.J. (L 311) 67 at art. 87 with Food & Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997
(FDAMA), Pub. L. No. 105-115, § 401; see Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 102(a)(1), 76 Stat. 781
(1962) and 21 C.F.R. § 99 (2008).
45. ENTERPRISE DIRECTORATE-GENERAL, supra note 22, at 7.
46. Id.
47. Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November
2001 on the Community Code Relating to Medicinal Products for Human Use, 2001 O.J. (L
311) 67 at art. 87.
48. See INT’L FED’N OF PHARMACEUTICAL MFRS. & ASS’NS, CODE OF PHARMACEUTICAL
MARKETING PRACTICES 7 (2006 Revision), available at www.ifpma.org/pdf/IFPMA-TheCodeFinalVersion-30May2006-EN.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2009); see also EUROPEAN FED’N OF
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUS. AND ASS’NS, CODE ON THE PROMOTION OF PRESCRIPTION-ONLY
MEDICINES TO, AND INTERACTIONS WITH, HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONALS 7 (2007), available at
www.efpia.org/Objects/2/Files/code%20medicines%202007.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2009).
49. European Medicines Agency, About EMEA – Structure, at www.emea.europa.eu/
htms/aboutus/emeaoverview.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2009).
50. See S. Conroy et al., Unlicensed and Off Label Drug Use in Acute Lymphoblastic
Leukaemia and Other Malignancies in Children, 14 ANNALS OF ONCOLOGY 42, 42 (2003)
(finding that “[n]inety per cent of babies in neonatal intensive care receive unlicensed or off
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prescribing “unlicensed” drugs rather than “off-label use,” which extends the
definition of the practice to include prescribing drugs that are not approved
for any particular use at all, such as caffeine.51 While promotion of offlabel indications is regulated extensively by the EU authorities, ensuring safe,
effective and affordable healthcare is the responsibility of the Member
States.52 The Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency
(MHRA) is the British equivalent of the FDA and is responsible for approving
various drug indications.53 Managing authorities such as National Health
Service (NHS) Trusts54 or individual medical practices may further regulate
and even prohibit off-label prescribing.55 Additionally, the National Institute
for Clinical Excellence (NICE) identifies and makes recommendations to the
national healthcare authorities regarding which treatments are most effective
and cost-efficient for patients.56
While healthcare professionals in the U.K. believe that drug safety and
efficacy are important, licensing status was only ranked tenth out of twelve
choices in a survey of healthcare professionals addressing the prioritization
of pediatric medication.57 This relative lack of concern about licensing
status seems to reflect the same attitude that American doctors often have

label drugs; 65% of prescriptions are unlicensed of off label. Seventy per cent of children in
paediatric intensive care receive unlicensed or off label drugs.”); see also Ian Wong et al.,
Paediatric Medicines Research in the UK: How to Move Forward?, 26 DRUG SAFETY 529, 530
(2003) (observing that “[t]here have been numerous studies to show that many of the
medicines used in children are used off-label or are unlicensed for use in children.”).
51. P. Hill, Off Licence and Off Label Prescribing in Children: Litigation Fears for
Physicians, 90 ARCHIVES OF DISEASE IN CHILDHOOD (SUPPLEMENT 1) i17, i17 (2005); Conroy et
al., supra note 50.
52. See Markus Hartmann & Florence Hartmann-Vareilles, Recent Developments in
European Pharmaceutical Law 2004: A Legal Point of View, 39 DRUG INFO. J. 193, 203-04
(2005), available at www.diahome.org/NR/rdonlyres/39B6663D-0BA9-4666-A7F9-D598E
851442E/0/DIJ39_2_193.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2009) (discussing how “public health
remains a subject of complex national and inter-Member-State actions” and how Member
States can decide the degree to which they will protect public health within the confines of the
EC treaty).
53. Hill, supra note 51, at i17; see also Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory
Agency, at www.mhra.gov.uk/index.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2009).
54. For an explanation of NHS Trusts, see National Health Service, About the NHS: NHS
Authorities and Trusts, at www.nhs.uk/aboutnhs/howtheNHSworks/authoritiesandtrusts/Pages/
Authoritiesandtrusts.aspx (last visited Jan. 3, 2009).
55. Hill, supra note 51, at i17.
56. Andrew Dillon et al., The National Institute for Clinical Excellence and Coverage of
Relenza by the NHS, in INFORMING JUDGMENT: CASE STUDIES OF HEALTH POLICY AND RESEARCH
IN SIX COUNTRIES 137, 144, 146, (2001).
57. Wong et al., supra note 50, at 531 tbl.1 (noting that safety, efficacy and
characteristics of the disease, among other factors, ranked above licensing status as “most
relevant when prescribing paediatric medications”).
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regarding prescribing off-label. Further, the Consumers International Report
shows that pharmaceutical companies approach the market in the U.K. the
same way they do in the U.S., knowing that there is a significant market for
off-label use.58
D. Off-Label Prescribing Practices in Switzerland
Switzerland is not a member of the EU, and thus is not subject to the
approval process of the EMEA or the directives of the Parliament and the
Council.59 The Swiss Agency for Therapeutic Products, otherwise known as
Swiss Medic, is the Swiss equivalent of the FDA and the MHRA, and
oversees how new drugs are approved and promoted in Switzerland.60
Switzerland has laws similar to those of the U.S. and the EU prohibiting the
dissemination of information regarding unapproved uses of medicines.61
The Loi sur les produits thérapeutiques (LPTh) (Law on Therapeutic Products)
and l’Ordonnance sur la publicité pour les médicaments (OPMéd)
(Ordinance on the Advertising of Medicines) strictly regulate communication
by pharmaceutical companies directed toward physicians pertaining to new
drugs.62 Article 2, letter (a) of OPMéd defines publicité (“advertising”) as
“toute forme d’information, de prospection ou d’incitation qui vise à
encourager la prescription, la remise, la vente, la consommation ou
l’utilisation de médicaments” (that is, any form of information, canvassing,
or inducement designed to promote the prescription, delivery, sale,
consumption or use of a drug).63 This provision has been interpreted to
even include messages that are purely informative and objective if they have

58. CONSUMERS INT’L, supra note 43.
59. U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Public Affairs: Electronic Information and Publications
Office, Background Note: Switzerland, at “History”, at www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3431.htm
(last visited Jan. 3, 2009).
60. Swissmedic, Our Core Business: About Swissmedic: Swissmedic, at www.swiss
medic.ch/en/industrie/overall.asp?theme=0.00098.00001&theme_id=512 (last visited Jan.
3, 2009).
61. See generally Junod, supra note 18, at 1399 (a Swiss article discussing [in French]
three 2006 decisions on off-label promotion of drugs in Switzerland rendered by the
Commission recours pour les produits thérapeutiques [Appeals Committee for Therapeutic
Products] under the loi sur les produits thérapeutiques [law on Therapeutic Products] and
l’Ordonnance sur la publicité pour les medicaments [Ordinance on the Advertising of
Medications]).
62. Id. at 1400; Federal Law on Medicinal Products and Medical Devices (Law on
Therapeutic Products - LTP), arts. 31-33 (2007) (Switz.); Ordonnance sur la publicité pour les
médicaments [OPMéd] [Ordinance on the Advertising of Medicines] Oct. 17, 2001,
812.212.5 art. 2.a (Switz.).
63. Ordonnance sur la publicité pour les medicaments [OPMéd] [Ordinance on the
Advertising of Medicines] Oct. 17, 2001, 812.212.5 art. 2.a (Switz.).
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the effect of increasing sales.64 In order to avoid the label of “advertising,”
and thus falling into a category of communication subject to strict regulation
and often prohibited, a communication from a pharmaceutical company
cannot identify any certain drug or any particular class of drugs.65 However,
manufacturers are required to communicate information to physicians
regarding the safety and efficacy of their drugs, and this communication is
considered legal as long as it does not result in increased drug sales.66 The
central idea is that no information can be disseminated which could have
the effect of increasing sales and therefore producing profit for the drug
companies.67
As is the case in many other countries, off-label drug use is common in
Switzerland, particularly in pediatrics.68 While Swiss off-label promotion
laws are stricter than those in the U.S., physicians still maintain prescribing
freedom in Switzerland.69 SwissMedic only approves the marketing of a
drug for the indications of that drug which have been verified by a thorough
evaluation of pharmaceutical interest, quality, and the overall safety of the
drug.70 Similarly, drug makers are not allowed to disseminate any
information that is outside the scope of the drug’s approval, including any
favorable results of clinical studies on non-approved uses, even if those
results are incontestable.71 Further, SwissMedic forbids communication
about non-approved uses on Swiss public internet sites.72 If a manufacturer
wants to publicize such information, it must first seek modification of the
drug’s approved indications from SwissMedic, a stricter regulation than
FDAMA’s requirement that a company be simply actively seeking approval
of the off-label indication before disseminating such information.73
Since doctors are free to prescribe drugs as they wish, there is concern
that the prohibition of publicizing positive results of drug studies will prevent
a physician from gaining a complete understanding of the drugs he or she

64. Junod, supra note 18, at 1400.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1400, 1403 n.12.
67. See id. at 1401 (noting that the practice of off-label prescribing is legal in
Switzerland).
68. Ermindo R. Di Paolo et al., Unlicensed and Off-Label Drug Use in a Swiss Paediatric
University Hospital: A Pilot Study, 136 SWISS MED. WKLY. 218, 220, 221 (2006).
69. Junod, supra note 18, at 1401.
70. E.R. Di Paolo et al., Incidence des prescriptions hors autorisation de mise sur le
marché dans le département médico-chirurgical de pédiatrie d’un chu Suisse, Congrès annuel
de la Société Suisse de Pédiatrie, Davos, June 26-28, 2003, available at www.chuv.ch/pha/
pha_poster_ssp-amm.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2009).
71. Junod, supra note 18, at 1400.
72. Id. at 1402.
73. Id. at 1401; see also supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
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prescribes.74 In light of the common off-label uses of many drugs, and the
concerns surrounding such uses, SwissMedic has taken measures to
promote increased approval for off-label and unlicensed drugs, particularly
those used in pediatrics.75 One notable action that SwissMedic has taken is
to extend the patent protection for pharmaceutical companies who
voluntarily research uses of drugs that are currently used off-label in
children.76 Since inadequate patent protection is one of the factors that
arguably contributes to the reluctance of pharmaceutical companies to seek
approval of off-label indications,77 this protection may lead to a reduction in
the prevalence of off-label and unlicensed drug use in Switzerland.
Given that physician autonomy is consistently honored in Switzerland,78
as well as in the U.K., it seems off-label prescribing will remain a common
practice in the absence of significant changes to the regulatory framework of
these countries. The frequency of off-label prescribing complicates how
insurance providers differentiate between drugs that will and will not be
covered. This uncertainty is particularly relevant to government-funded
insurance programs, where cost is an important concern. In the United
States, voters are significantly divided on this issue. Some believe that the
government should provide everyone with affordable healthcare, while
others worry about how such an approach would be financed, and whether
the government is really capable of providing adequate healthcare coverage
on such a large scale.79 This concern already puts any potential American
universal healthcare system in a vice, particularly with regard to prescription
drug coverage, as legislators grapple with how to provide efficient coverage
that keeps costs low while maintaining superior quality for all patients.

74. Junod, supra note 18, at 1401.
75. Di Paolo et al., supra note 70, at 220.
76. Id.
77. See Weeks, supra note 1, at 663 (discussing the shorter patent life of secondary
indications).
78. See Junod, supra note 18, at 1401 (noting that off-label prescribing is legal in
Switzerland and often conforms to the standards of good medicine); see also Weeks, supra
note 1, at 647 (noting how the FDA “has disavowed any authority to regulate the off-label
prescribing practices of individual physicians.”); see also Johnson, supra note 3, at 68-69
(discussing how an off-label use of a drug can become “the customary standard of care” in
certain circumstances, and how the FDA lacks the authority “to ‘limit or interfere with the
authority of a health care practitioner to prescribe or administer any legally marketed
[medical] device to a patient for any condition or disease within a legitimate health care
practitioner-patient relationship.’”).
79. Robin Toner & Janet Elder, Most Support U.S. Guarantee of Health Care, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 2, 2007, at A1.
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III. GOVERNMENT FUNDED HEALTHCARE
A.

Government Funded Insurance in the United States

In the U.S., the concept of government-funded healthcare is relatively
foreign, compared to other countries.80 Currently, federal programs such as
Medicare and Medicaid are two of the primary ways that the U.S.
government funds healthcare. These programs provide health insurance to
senior citizens, disabled individuals, and the poor.81 Together, Medicare
and Medicaid provide medical and prescription drug coverage to
approximately eighty million people.82 Because Medicare and Medicaid
provide healthcare coverage for approximately one third of the U.S.
population,83 these programs are good models to examine when
considering how an American universal healthcare regime might be
structured.
Medicare and Medicaid present two different ways in which the
government works to reconcile the competing goals of patient welfare and
cost containment in the context of reimbursement for off-label drug use.
Since off-label use is not an exclusively American phenomenon, this note
will consider the approaches used in the U.K. and Switzerland to balance
patient welfare and cost containment in an effort to analyze how those
approaches may provide a model for the United States. Healthcare in the
U.K. emphasizes cost-effectiveness, as scarce healthcare resources must be
rationed among many patients, all of whom receive free healthcare at the
point of service.84 Switzerland mandates that every individual who can
afford to buy comprehensive health insurance does so, and the cost of the
premium is set by the government in an effort to “bring more solidarity” to

80. See The University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School of Business, ‘Harry and Louise,’
the Sequel? The Universal Health Care Debate is Back, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON, June 27,
2007, at http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=1761 (last visited Jan. 3,
2009) (discussing how public opinion has affected prospects for universal healthcare in the
United States, and how the views of American citizens compare with those of citizens of
countries with strong universal healthcare systems).
81. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (1965); see
also Alma Koch, Financing Health Systems, in INTRODUCTION TO HEALTH SERVICES 76, 78
(Stephen J. Williams & Paul R. Torrens eds., 7th ed. 2007).
82. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH
INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2006, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: CONSUMER
INCOME 20 (2007).
83. Koch, supra note 81, at 78; see Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook:
The United States, at www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html (last
visited Jan. 3, 2009) (As of July 2008, the population of the U.S. was estimated to be
303,824,640).
84. Dillon et al., supra note 56, at 144, 146.
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the Swiss healthcare system.85 Since the government subsidizes the cost of
healthcare for citizens who cannot afford it, and since the government feels
pressure from voters to keep premiums low, cost-containment is an
important issue for the Swiss government.86 An examination of the British
and Swiss healthcare systems indicates how cost-effectiveness may affect
coverage for off-label prescription drugs, and provides lessons that may be
incorporated into an American healthcare system.
1. Medicare
Medicare is a federal program designed to provide healthcare services
to senior citizens and disabled individuals.87 Designed as a federal
entitlement program, Medicare was established by the Social Security Act of
1965 and helps pay for hospital stays, outpatient treatment, and
prescription drugs.88 Medicare is divided into four parts: Part A covers
hospital insurance benefits,89 Part B covers outpatient therapies administered
in a doctor’s office,90 Part C covers the Medicare+Choice Program,91 and
Part D covers a voluntary prescription drug benefit.92 Part D was established
under the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA), and stipulates that
prescription drug coverage be designed and administered by private
insurance Prescription Drug Plans (PDPs) that are then reimbursed by the
government.93 Unlike Parts A and B, Part D is not standardized, giving
individual private health insurance providers the freedom to determine what
drugs they will cover, as long as those drugs are not specifically excluded
from coverage by Medicare.94
Chemotherapy and other outpatient drug treatments that are
administered at a doctor’s office are covered under Part B.95 As nearly fifty
percent of the uses of anticancer chemotherapy drugs are off-label,
Congress has had to address the issue of off-label use under this part of
85. Interview by Frontline with Pascal Couchepin, President of Switzerland (Oct. 30,
2007) at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/sickaroundtheworld/interviews/couchepin.html
(last visited Jan. 3, 2009) [hereinafter Couchepin Interview].
86. Id.
87. Koch, supra note 81, at 78.
88. Id. at 86-90; see also Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79
Stat. 286 (1965).
89. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395c - 1395i-5 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
90. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395j - 1395w-4 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
91. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395w-21 - 1395w-28 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
92. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-102 (Supp. IV 2004).
93. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 781-85 (6th ed.
2008); Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003).
94. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 93, at 782-83.
95. Id. at 777; 42 U.S.C. § 1395k(a)(2) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
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Medicare.96 Congress enacted the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
(OBRA) in 1993, which required Medicare to cover off-label uses of
anticancer drugs included in designated medical compendia.97 OBRA
works in conjunction with the provisions of the Social Security Act (SSA)
which require that Medicare cover drugs for both FDA-approved indications
and off-label uses supported in the American Hospital Formulary ServiceDrug Information98 or in the U.S. Pharmacopoeia-Drug Information.99 The
Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) may designate additional
compendia as references that support certain off-label uses, as well as
identify peer-reviewed medical journals that may offer guidance to Medicare
contractors about off-label uses that are supported by clinical data.100
Under Part D, the Medicare statute references the provisions of the
Medicaid statute that cover drugs approved by the FDA and those that were
in use before 1962, but does not refer directly to the definition of “medically
necessary” that requires consulting the three compendia.101 If this part of
the Medicare statute is to be interpreted explicitly, it would only cover FDAapproved drugs.102 A report issued by a patients’ rights group shows how
such a strict interpretation of the statute under the Bush administration
resulted in the loss of coverage for some people of off-label uses that were
covered prior to switching to Medicare’s Part D plan.103
Even when the statute is read more inclusively, Part D still only covers
FDA-approved drugs and drugs that are found in one of the three

96. Am. Soc’y Clinical Oncology, Reimbursement for Cancer Treatment: Coverage of OffLabel Drug Indications, 24 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 3206, 3206 (2006).
97. Pub. L. No. 103-66, 1107 Stat. 312 (1993); § 13553, 107 Stat. 591-92; Am. Soc’y
of Clinical Oncology, supra note 96.
98. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(t)(2) (2000); Am. Soc’y of Health-System Pharmacists, AHFS Drug
Information: Off-Label Use, at www.ahfsdruginformation.com/off_label/index.aspx (last visited
Jan. 3, 2009).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(t)(2) (2000); U.S. Pharmacopeial Convention, USP-NF-An
Overview, at www.usp.org/USPNF/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2009); see also Am. Soc’y Clinical
Oncology, supra note 96, at 3206 (noting that the even though the statute references the
American Medical Association Drug Evaluation, this third compendium has been merged into
the U.S. Pharmacopeia-Drug Information).
100. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(t)(2) (2000); Am. Soc’y Clinical Oncology, supra note 96, at
3207.
101. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-102(e) (Supp. IV 2004); Part D Denial of Access to ‘Off-Label’
Drugs Based on Misreading of Statute, Report Says, 5 Pharmaceutical L. & Industry Rep. (BNA)
No. 32, at 834 (Aug. 10, 2007); MEDICARE RIGHTS CTR., OFF-BASE: THE EXCLUSION OF OFFLABEL PRESCRIPTIONS FROM MEDICARE PART D COVERAGE 7 (2007), available at www.medicare
rights.org/Off-label_PartD_Coverage.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2009).
102. MEDICARE RIGHTS CTR., supra note 101.
103. Id.
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compendia cited in the Medicaid statute.104 However, there is no means for
compendia expansion by the Secretary of HHS under Part D as there is
under Part B.105 According to one patient advocacy group, Part D is
significantly narrower in its coverage of off-label use, and it lacks any sort of
effective appeal procedure when a patient is denied coverage.106
This difficulty with coverage of off-label uses under Part D is the subject
of a recent complaint filed in the Southern District of New York against
Michael O. Leavitt, in his official capacity as the Secretary of HHS.107 The
complainant, Judith Layzer, was a cancer survivor who has used the drug
Cetrotide off-label since 1999 to treat and limit her cancer.108 This off-label
use of the drug was covered by Ms. Layzer’s employer sponsored insurance
before she switched to prescription drug coverage under Part D, at which
point, she was faced with the option of no coverage or, alternatively, copayments exceeding $7,000.109 The complaint alleged that the Secretary of
HHS was wrong in determining that the complainant’s off-label use of
Cetrotide was unlawful because it was not FDA-approved or included in one
of the three compendia, despite her doctors’ repeated statements regarding
the medical necessity of the drug to treat her cancer.110 When Layzer
appealed the initial denial of her coverage to the Office of Medicare
Hearings and Appeals, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that heard her
case admitted that the medical necessity of her therapy had “been firmly
established by three prominent and highly qualified physicians who [were]
familiar with” complainant’s “uniquely serious medical condition”, but
nevertheless had to rule that coverage was not covered by Medicare Part
D.111 The ALJ noted that peer-reviewed literature supported the use of
Cetrotide to treat ovarian cancer, and that his ruling created a discrepancy
in Medicare coverage as the use would have been covered under Part B.112
Whether interpreted strictly or more broadly, by considering everything
covered by the Medicaid statute, off-label prescription drug coverage is
104. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-102(e) (Supp. IV 2004); 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(k)(2)-(6) (2000);
Letter from Medicare Access for Patients Rx to Max Baucus, Senate Finance Committee
Chairman, United States Senate (Nov. 15, 2007) available at www.medicarerights.org/
maprxlettertobaucus.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2009), [hereinafter MAPRx Letter].
105. Patient Advocates Urge Changes to Medicare to Allow Broader Coverage of Off-Label
Drugs, 46 Pharmaceutical L. & Industry Rep. (BNA) No. 46, at 1233 (Nov. 30, 2007).
106. MAPRx Letter, supra note 104.
107. Complaint at 1-3, Judith M. Layzer & Ray J. Fischer v. Michael O. Leavitt, No. 07CV-11339 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2007).
108. Id. at 3.
109. Id. at 8-9.
110. See id. at 7, 18-19.
111. Id. at 10.
112. Complaint at 10, Judith M. Layzer & Ray J. Fischer v. Michael O. Leavitt, No. 07-CV11339 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2007).
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significantly limited by the Medicare Part D Prescription Drug Benefit.113
Unlike Part B, which is provided by Medicare directly and is funded through
beneficiary premiums and general revenue funds,114 Part D benefits are
provided by private PDPs, which are awarded contracts with HHS based on
their bids for various coverage areas.115 The PDPs are only required to meet
certain minimum coverage conditions, but other terms and conditions can
be negotiated with HHS; consequently, plans can vary from the “standard
coverage” elements listed in the legislation as long as they substitute
“actuarially equivalent” coverage.116
Since PDPs must bid to receive contracts from HHS to provide
prescription drug coverage,117 and are thus significantly influenced by
market forces, it seems unlikely that they will offer coverage of drugs that are
not explicitly required by Medicare and which cost more than the benefit the
PDP would derive from covering the drug. This idea is evidenced by the fact
that off-label coverage is much more inclusive under Part B (which is
provided directly by Medicare)118 than it is under Part D.
2. Medicaid
The Medicaid program was established as a joint federal-state funded
welfare program to assist states with healthcare costs for the poor.119
Although “states are not required to participate in [Medicaid], if a state
chooses to do so, it must comply with federal statutory and regulatory
requirements” for mandatory services.120 Coverage for outpatient
prescription drugs is an optional service, but as with all optional Medicaid
programs, “once a state elects to provide an optional service, that service
becomes part of the state Medicaid plan and is subject to the requirements

113. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-102(e) (Supp. IV 2004); see also MAPRx Letter, supra note 104
(stating that “Medicare regulations are overly stringent. They exclude Part D coverage of
medications—no matter how medically necessary—when they are prescribed for uses that are
not listed on the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) label or supported by a citation in
one of three specific medical compendia.”).
114. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE: A PRIMER 16 (2008), available at
www.kff.org/medicare/upload/7615-02.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2009).
115. FURROW ET AL., supra note 93, at 782.
116. Id. at 783.
117. Id. at 782.
118. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE: A PRIMER 16 (2008), available at
www.kff.org/medicare/upload/7615-02.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2009).
119. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004); see also Edmonds v. Levine, 417 F.
Supp. 2d 1323, 1326 (S.D. Fla. 2006).
120. Edmonds, 417 F. Supp. 2d at 1326; 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
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of federal law.”121 All states currently offer Medicaid prescription drug
benefits.122
Medicaid covers “medically accepted indication[s]” of “any use for a
covered outpatient drug.”123 “Medically accepted” is defined as a use
which is approved by the FDA, or a non-FDA approved use which is
supported by citation in one of three approved compendia.124 In addition to
subjecting a covered outpatient drug to prior authorization, there are four
other ways a state Medicaid agency may exclude drugs outside of this
definition from coverage:
1. Prescribed use is not for a medically accepted indication (either FDA
approved or supported by citation in a compendium);
2. Drug is listed as a restricted drug in § 1396r-8(d)(2) or is subsequently
determined by the Secretary of HHS by regulation to be subject to
clinical abuse or inappropriate use;
3. Drug is subject to restriction pursuant to an agreement between the state
and drug manufacturer; or
4. Drug has been excluded by a state-established formulary, which is a list
of Medicaid eligible drugs for which the state will provide reimbursement
when prescribed for medically accepted indications.125

If a state decides to require prior authorization of an excluded drug,
there are two means by which it can do so: pursuant to the state’s formulary
or as authorized directly by the Medicaid Act.126 Under the former option, if
a doctor wishes to prescribe a drug that has been excluded under the state’s
formulary, he or she can “contact the state, convey medical information
specific to the patient, and perhaps obtain an exception to the exclusion for
the requested drug (and thus obtain reimbursement for that drug).”127
However, the doctor’s request can be denied by the state, making the state
“the final authority over coverage of non-formulary drugs.”128 Thus, states

121. Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709, 714 (11th Cir. 1998); see also 42 U.S.C. §
1396d(a)(12) (2000 & Supp IV 2004).
122. Dawn M. Gencarelli, Medicaid Prescription Drug Coverage: State Efforts to Control
Costs, NAT’L HEALTH POL’Y F. ISSUE BRIEF NO. 790 (George Washington U., Wash. D.C.), May
10, 2003, at 3, available at http://nhpf.ags.com/pdfs_ib/IB790_StateRx_5-10-03.pdf (last
visited Jan. 3, 2009).
123. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396r-8(k)(6), (k)(2)(A) (2000).
124. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(k)(6) (2000).
125. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(d)(1)(B)(i)-(iv) (2000).
126. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(d)(4)-(5) (2000).
127. Edmonds v. Levine, 417 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1328 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (emphasis added).
128. Id.
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can restrict the coverage of off-label drug uses to a greater degree than the
Medicaid Act does alone.
The second type of prior authorization program was established by the
Medicaid Act itself. Under this approach, when a doctor wishes to prescribe
a drug that requires prior authorization, he or she must first contact the state
pharmacist who then shares information with the doctor about possible
alternatives that are equally effective but less costly.129 Ultimately, however,
the doctor’s right to prescribe the original drug is guaranteed one hundred
percent as long as he or she calls the state pharmacist.130 Just having this
added means of communicating equally effective and less costly drug
remedies has produced “substantial cost savings for organizations
purchasing large volumes of drugs.”131 In this sense, prior authorization
cannot be used to deny coverage of off-label uses that are approved under
the Medicaid Act, as can be done in situations where prior authorization is
tied to a state formulary.132 Rather, a state can only condition coverage on
the doctor making the call to the state pharmacist.133
The issue of whether a state can deny coverage under its Medicaid laws
after establishing a certain type of prior approval procedure was recently
litigated in Florida. In Edmonds v. Levine, the refusal of Florida’s Medicaid
agency to “cover off-label drugs cited in any of the drug compendia unless
they are supported by double-blind, placebo-controlled, randomized clinical
trials” was found to violate the Medicaid Act.134 Florida had not established
a drug formulary. Therefore, prior authorization procedures were based on
the Medicaid Act, which does not allow for outright denial of a covered
drug.135 In this case, the Florida Medicaid agency tried to condition
approval on results similar to what would be required for FDA approval,
which was more than the state is allowed to do.136
Under the Medicaid Act, a state may limit drugs which would normally
be covered under Medicaid by excluding the drugs from the state formulary,
as long as the excluded drug “‘does not have a significant, clinically
meaningful therapeutic advantage in terms of safety, effectiveness, or

129. Id. at 1329.
130. Id.
131. Id.; see also Pharm. Research and Mfrs. of America v. Meadows, 304 F.3d 1197,
1198 (11th Cir. 2002) (discussing Florida’s drug formulary and the impact of requiring
physicians to call the state pharmacist, concluding that “[d]uring the first three months of the
program, approximately 55 percent of all…calls…resulted in a change of the prescription to a
drug on the preferred drug list.”).
132. Edmonds, 417 F. Supp. 2d at 1329.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1336.
135. Id. at 1329.
136. See Weeks, supra note 1, at 655 (discussing FDA clinical trial requirements).
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clinical outcome’ over other drugs included in the formulary.”137 However,
if a state does not establish a formulary, coverage defaults to the Medicaid
Act, which covers all FDA-approved indications and those which are
included in one of the three compendia.138 This seems to focus mostly on
the best remedy for the patient, while still giving the states relative autonomy
regarding what they will choose to cover based on their individual budgets
and plan structures.
3. Socialized Medicine in the United Kingdom
Healthcare in the U.K. is publicly financed through “non-earmarked
general taxation and national insurance contributions” which are allocated
by the National Health Service (NHS).139 These funding sources cover most
healthcare services at the point of delivery; prescription drugs are covered
by flat-rate charges, “although the majority of users qualify for exemption
from prescription drug charges.”140 In England, general practices (GPs)
provide primary healthcare services under contracts between the
independent practitioners and the NHS.141 GPs are paid on a capitation
basis and this income is supplemented by a Basic Practice Allowance.142
Hospital services are provided through NHS Trusts, which employ the entire
staff of the hospital.143
Traditionally, doctors’ decisions in the U.K. have remained largely free
from government control, but the establishment of the National Institute for
Clinical Excellence (NICE) in 1999 has led to increased regulation of
clinical practices.144 The aim of NICE is to identify the practices that make
the best use of resources and how those resources can be rationed in the
healthcare system.145 NICE advises on the cost-effective use of NHS
resources and establishes clinical guidelines and a framework for clinical
governance.146 NICE has faced resistance from the pharmaceutical

137. Edmonds, 417 F. Supp. 2d at 1328 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(d)(4)(C) (2000)).
138. See Edmonds, 417 F. Supp. 2d at 1327-28 (discussing how inclusion of a drug in a
state formulary is the only way a state can unilaterally exclude an indication which would
otherwise be considered medically accepted under federal law).
139. Dillon et al., supra note 56, at 141; National Health Service, About the NHS, at
www.nhs.uk/aboutnhs/Pages/About.aspx (last visited Jan. 3, 2009).
140. Dillion et al., supra note 56, at 141.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 142.
145. Dillon et al., supra note 56, at 138.
146. Tom Walley et al., An Integrated National Pharmaceutical Policy for the United
Kingdom?, 321 BRIT. MED. J. 1523, 1524 (2000).
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industry, which claims that NICE decisions undermine “the continued
existence of the pharmaceutical industry in the United Kingdom.”147
A significant issue in any universal healthcare system is how to keep
coverage high and costs low, as there is only so much money to cover
everyone. The U.K. provides a model of this struggle with respect to
prescription drugs because the cost of prescription drugs has increased,
while widespread exemptions from drug co-payments have effectively
assigned the burden of this additional cost to the NHS.148 In the U.K.,
prescription drugs are covered by a fixed co-payment of around £6.00 per
prescription, but many people are exempt from this charge.149 A significant
portion of the NHS budget is therefore spent on pharmaceuticals, and
notable increases in the amount that NHS spends on pharmaceuticals
relative to other budget items has raised concern in recent years.150 As a
result, commentators in the U.K. have called for analysis of costeffectiveness before NHS decides whether or not to pay for a new drug.151
Just like in the U.S., drug approval in the U.K. is based on proof of the
drug’s safety and efficacy.152 Subsequent to this approval, NICE
recommends whether a drug should be publicly funded based on both
clinical effectiveness and cost-effectiveness, taking into consideration how
the drug will impact a patient’s quality of care compared with the cost of the
drug relative to available alternatives.153 The guidance promulgated by
NICE to NHS is meant to standardize healthcare across the country and end
problems such as “rationing by postcode”, that is, “uneven access in
geographical areas”.154 Once NICE decides to recommend a medicine,
“the NHS is legally obliged to fund and resource” that medicine.155
The role of NICE in approving drugs and devices reflects the onset of
new data requirements that have arisen generally in European countries as
a means of efficient healthcare delivery (including effectiveness, cost-

147. Id. at 1523.
148. EUROPEAN OBSERVATORY ON HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS, HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS IN
TRANSITION: UNITED KINGDOM 82 (1999), available at www.euro.who.int/document/
e68283.pdf (last visited Jan. 3 2009) [hereinafter EUROPEAN OBSERVATORY REPORT].
149. Dillon et al., supra note 56, at 142.
150. Id. NHS allocates over twelve percent of its annual budget to cover this difference.
Id.
151. Id. at 143.
152. Id. at 152.
153. Id.
154. Dillon et al., supra note 56, at 138; National Health Service, National Institute for
Health and Clinical Excellence, About Technology Appraisals, at www.nice.org.uk/aboutnice/
whatwedo/abouttechnologyappraisals/about_technology_appraisals.jsp (last visited Jan. 3,
2009) [hereinafter NICE Appraisals].
155. NICE Appraisals, supra note 154.
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effectiveness and budgetary impact).156 This trend is further demonstrated
by the fact that there is a “Limited List” in the U.K.—a list of drugs that have
been excluded from NHS prescribing on the grounds of “poor therapeutic
value or excessive cost.”157 Taking into account both clinical and costeffectiveness could likely lead to the exclusion of off-label treatments that
are found lacking in such a cross-analysis.
4. Mandatory Health Insurance in Switzerland
Some have suggested that the Swiss system of universal healthcare
would be the best model for the United States to follow when structuring its
own universal healthcare system.158 Switzerland is a democratic, capitalist
country that is not a member of the European Union, and since 1994 it has
had a system of healthcare that requires every citizen have health
insurance.159 For those who can afford it, the government has set a uniform
flat premium rate at the equivalent of $750 for individual basic
comprehensive coverage, and for those who cannot afford to pay for the
premium, the government subsidizes the cost.160 Swiss law prohibits
insurance companies from making a profit on basic insurance coverage, but
allows more competition for supplemental insurance, such as dental
coverage.161
The societal view in Switzerland is that everyone has a right to high
quality healthcare, just as one would have a right to education or a legal
defense in the United States.162 For this right, citizens of Switzerland pay
more for their health insurance than citizens of any other European
country.163 But while Swiss citizens commonly protest the rising cost of
premiums, they still spend substantially less on healthcare than Americans
do, almost no one ever goes bankrupt due to medical bills, and everyone,

156. See Mark J. C. Nuijten & Joszef Kosa, Pricing of Pharmaceuticals: Assessing the
Pricing Potential by a Pricing Matrix Model, 2 EUR. J. HEALTH ECON. 110, 110 (2004).
157. EUROPEAN OBSERVATORY REPORT, supra note 148, at 82.
158. See Julie Rovner, In Switzerland, A Health Care Model For America?, NAT’L. PUB.
RADIO, ALL THINGS CONSIDERED, July 31, 2008, at www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyId=92106731(last visited Jan. 3, 2009); see also Couchepin Interview, supra
note 85 (interviewer stating that the Swiss system has been looked to as a model for an
American universal healthcare system since Switzerland has a market-driven economy that is
similar to the U.S. economy.)
159. Couchepin Interview, supra note 85.
160. Frontline, Five Capitalist Democracies & How They Do It, at www.pbs.org/wgbh/
pages/frontline/sickaroundtheworld/countries/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2009) [hereinafter Frontline
Report].
161. Id.
162. See Couchepin Interview, supra note 85.
163. Id.
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regardless of socio-economic status, receives the same quality of care.164
However, healthcare costs in Switzerland have increased substantially since
1994, due in part to the fact that people tend to use healthcare services
more when health coverage becomes compulsory in an effort to get their
money’s worth, which has caused Switzerland’s president to question
whether mandated universal coverage was the appropriate path to take
towards universal healthcare.165
While the standard price of medical services is negotiated between the
providers and the insurers, the price of prescription drugs is set by the
government.166 To keep costs as low as possible, the Swiss government
requires people to take generics whenever possible. If they choose nongeneric drugs, they have to pay at least part of the higher additional cost on
their own.167 For prescription drugs, the government looks to other
European countries and sets prices after considering the average prices of
the most commonly used drugs.168 This approach is used despite the
influence of powerful Swiss pharmaceutical companies, who have accepted
the mandate of using generics.169 Perhaps this is because Swiss citizens still
pay more for drugs than most other Europeans, and the Swiss government is
admittedly open to paying more for “new drugs with huge therapeutic
advantage” in an effort to “support innovation and not to support profits in
[and of themselves].”170
This approach to prescription drugs may be why Switzerland is a country
where off-label and unlicensed drug use is common, particularly in pediatric
wards.171 As discussed supra, SwissMedic has established that it will extend
the patent protection for any drug where the manufacturer voluntarily
endeavors to research uses of that drug in children, so that the drug may no
longer have to be prescribed off-label.172 In Switzerland, the healthcare
system is designed to provide all citizens with high-quality, comprehensive
care,173 and this underlying aim explains, in part, the government’s

164. Id.; see generally USA TODAY, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION & HARVARD
SCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH, HEALTH CARE COSTS SURVEY (2005) (summarizing findings of how
health care costs have impacted access to care, with special attention to members of lower
socio-economic classes who tend to avoid care for chronic conditions due to cost).
165. Couchepin Interview, supra note 85.
166. Id.; see also Frontline Report, supra note 160.
167. Couchepin Interview, supra note 85.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See Di Paolo et al., supra note 70, at 218, 220.
172. Id.; see also supra note 76 and accompanying text.
173. SWISS CONFEDERATION, FED. DEP’T OF HOME AFF., FED. OFFICE OF PUB. HEALTH, THE
COMPULSORY HEALTH INSURANCE IN SWITZERLAND: YOUR QUESTIONS, OUR ANSWERS 4 (2008), at
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openness to paying higher prices for drugs and providing incentives for
continued research of unapproved uses.
Not all drugs are covered carte-blanche in Switzerland, however. Under
the basic comprehensive insurance required of all citizens, only those drugs
that are prescribed by a doctor and included in the “List of pharmaceutical
specialties” are covered.174 This list is compiled by the Swiss Federal Office
of Public Health (FOPH) and currently includes roughly 2,400 medications,
although the list is frequently revised “in light of medical progress.”175 In
addition to the drugs included on the “List of pharmaceutical specialties,”
pharmacists are permitted to dispense equivalent generic drugs unless the
prescribing physician has specifically ordered the brand name drug for
medical reasons.176
More generally, FOPH states that “[t]he basic assumption concerning
medical benefits is that they comply with legal provisions relative to
effectiveness, appropriateness and efficiency.”177 FOPH allows denials of
coverage to be challenged before an expert commission, but the Federal
Department of Home Affairs retains the authority to make the final decisions
with respect to such appeals.178
The Swiss government remains open to working with the pharmaceutical
companies to approve new uses for drugs, while still understanding the need
to protect patient welfare and keep costs manageable. By limiting the
market’s influence over the off-label use of pharmaceuticals by strictly
prohibiting the promotion of off-label uses, the Swiss system focuses its
efforts on patient safety as part of fulfilling the goal of providing all citizens
high-quality comprehensive care. The government’s control over drug
prices and the inclusion of a limited number of drugs under the basic health
insurance package adds to the concern about patient safety the additional
concern of cost-effectiveness. The Swiss approach to prescription drug is
substantially similar to that of the U.K., albeit structured in a slightly different
way, and thus outcomes for off-label drugs would also likely be similar.
IV. PROSPECTS FOR UNIVERSAL HEALTHCARE IN THE UNITED STATES
Proposals for American universal healthcare have become one of the
most discussed topics in healthcare over the past few years. The 2008

www.bag.admin.ch/themen/krankenversicherung/00263/00264/index.html?lang=en (follow
“Your questions, our answers” hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 3, 2009).
174. Id. at 7.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Federal Office of Public Health, 1. Medical Benefits, at www.bag.admin.ch/themen/
krankenversicherung/00263/00264/02418/index.html?lang=en (last visited Jan. 3, 2009).
178. Id.
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presidential election made the prospect of universal healthcare in America
more tangible than ever before. All three frontrunners for the 2008
Democratic presidential nomination touted their own versions of a universal
healthcare regime, and although the candidates borrowed ideas from each
other, each also introduced his or her own unique elements.179 Any future
universal healthcare regime will undoubtedly embody a mixture of many of
the elements introduced in these plans.
A critical first step towards establishing any universal healthcare regime
is to determine who will pay for it. Unlike some European plans where
coverage is completely funded by the government via tax revenue,180 most
proposals for American universal healthcare seek to modify the current
American health insurance system, in which some people are covered by
government-funded medical coverage while others are covered by private
insurance.181 Most proposals also rely on the existing Medicare and
Medicaid programs, but seek to strengthen federal and state partnerships
for these programs,182 or mandate that all children and young people are
covered through expansion of SCHIP and Medicaid.183 No matter how the
coverage plans are structured, the proposals contain other common
elements, including tax credits to individuals who cannot afford premiums
and co-pays but who do not qualify for Medicaid,184 as well as tax credits to
businesses so that they may provide comprehensive and “meaningful

179. Obama for America, Barack Obama’s Plan for a Healthy America: Lowering Health
Care Costs and Ensuring Affordable, High-Quality Health Care for All, available at
www.barackobama.com/pdf/HealthPlanFull.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2009) [hereinafter
Obama Plan]; Hillary for President, American Health Choices Plan: Quality, Affordable Health
Care for Every American, available at www.hillaryclinton.com/feature/healthcareplan/
americanhealthchoicesplan.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2009) [hereinafter Clinton Plan]; John
Edwards ‘08, Universal Health Care through Shared Responsibility, at www.johnedwards.com/
about/issues/health-care-overview.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2009) [hereinafter Edwards Plan].
180. See, e.g., Interview by Frontline with Nigel Hawkes, Health Editor for The Times of
London (Nov. 1, 2007), at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/sickaroundtheworld/
interviews/hawkes.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2009) (discussing the system of socialized medicine
in the U.K.).
181. See Obama Plan, supra note 179, at Quality, Affordable & Portable Health
Coverage for All; see generally Clinton Plan, supra note 179, at Executive Summary; see
generally Edwards Plan, supra note 179, at Universal Coverage Through Shared
Responsibility.
182. Edwards Plan, supra note 179, at Universal Coverage Through Shared Responsibility.
183. Obama Plan, supra note 179, at Quality, Affordable & Portable Health Coverage for
All.
184. Obama Plan, supra note 179, at Quality, Affordable & Portable Health Coverage for
All; Edwards Plan, supra note 179, at Universal Coverage Through Shared Responsibility;
Clinton Plan, supra note 179, at Executive Summary.
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coverage” to employees.185 Tax-credits may also be used to offset the cost
of catastrophic illnesses in the aging baby boomer population.186
Certain proposals have created institutions that would reform the private
insurance market by scrutinizing plans to ensure that they are comparable to
the public plan,187 or by creating purchasing pools which would allow for
the negotiation of low premiums based on economies of scale.188 This
proposed scrutiny of the private insurance market furthers an important aim
of most universal healthcare coverage proposals: cutting costs to make
insurance premiums fair and affordable for everyone. How much people
are able to pay is considered when determining what people will have to
pay, such as by limiting premiums to a certain percentage of the
beneficiary’s income.189 At the same time, these plans also focus on
providing high quality, effectiveness-tested health care, with some form of a
national, independent institution to ensure quality and effectiveness, another
element common to most universal healthcare proposals.190 The purpose of
these institutions would be two-fold: first, to ensure the highest quality of
care, and second, to make sure that the procedures, drugs, and devices in
current use are cost-efficient. To that end, most proposals promote research
and the use of generic drugs,191 and one proposal even goes as far as to
encourage the re-importation of drugs from countries where they are less
costly.192 Two suggested plans suggest changing the MMA so that
Medicare would be able to negotiate drug prices with pharmaceutical
companies, another effort to lower drug prices.193 Reducing cost would

185. Obama Plan, supra note 179, at Quality, Affordable & Portable Health Coverage for
All; Edwards Plan, supra note 179, at Universal Coverage Through Shared Responsibility;
Clinton Plan, supra note 179, at Executive Summary.
186. Clinton Plan, supra note 179, at Executive Summary.
187. Obama Plan, supra note 179, at Quality, Affordable & Portable Health Coverage for
All.
188. Edwards Plan, supra note 179, at Universal Coverage Through Shared Responsibility.
189. Clinton Plan, supra note 179, at Executive Summary.
190. Obama Plan, supra note 179, at Modernizing the U.S. Health Care System to Lower
Costs & Improve Quality; Clinton Plan, supra note 179, at Detailed Plan: Eliminate Insurance
Discrimination, Improve Quality, and Rein-in Costs; Edwards Plan, supra note 179, at
Affordable and Accountable Health Care.
191. Edwards Plan, supra note 179, at Affordable and Accountable Health Care; Obama
Plan, supra note 179, at Modernizing the U.S. Health Care System to Lower Costs & Improve
Quality.
192. Obama Plan, supra note 179, at Modernizing the U.S. Health Care System to Lower
Costs & Improve Quality.
193. Obama Plan, supra note 179, at Modernizing the U.S. Health Care System to Lower
Costs & Improve Quality; Clinton Plan, supra note 179, at Fiscal Responsibility that Honors
Priorities.
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clearly play a central role in any American universal healthcare program, as
it currently does in the British and Swiss systems.
V. ANALYSIS
It is no surprise that cost is a critical factor in determining how off-label
drug uses are covered by government-funded insurance programs. The
British model demonstrates how important rationing is when working with a
limited supply of resources. In the U.S., total spending on Medicare after
the implementation of the Part D Prescription Drug Benefit was expected to
increase from $342 billion in 2005 to $417.6 billion in 2006, while
continuing to grow in 2007.194 Spending on Medicaid, despite slowing
around 2005-2006, is expected to “grow 8.1 percent a year on average
from 2008 through 2016”, starting from a 2006 base of $313.5 billion.195
Further, spending on prescription drugs is expected to total $497.5 billion
by 2016.196
At the same time, the Swiss experience demonstrates that when
healthcare is compulsory for a population, an incentive to increase
consumption of healthcare services is created because people feel
compelled to get their money’s worth, which leads, in turn, to an overall
increase in healthcare expenditures.197 The creation of this incentive is one
of the ironies of universal healthcare—it has the potential to increase costs
even while the government that funds or subsidizes the system works to
contain costs. The theory of “moral hazard” is commonly used by
opponents of universal healthcare,198 but despite any negative
consequences that result from the structure of its healthcare system,
Switzerland still spends far less per capita on healthcare than the U.S.
does.199 The U.S. spent $6,714 per capita in total spending on healthcare
in 2006, the most of any country, while comparatively, Switzerland spent

194. Health Care Spending to Double by 2016, Despite Slight Slowdown in 2006, CMS
Says, 12 Health Care Daily Rep. (BNA) No. 34, at Lead Report (Feb. 21, 2007).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Couchepin Interview, supra note 85.
198. See generally Malcolm Gladwell, The Moral-Hazard Myth: The Bad Idea Behind Our
Failed Health-Care System, NEW YORKER, Aug. 29, 2005, at www.newyorker.com/archive/
2005/08/29/050829fa_fact?currentPage=all (last visited Jan. 3, 2009) (describing the
moral hazard theory as “a powerful impediment to the expansion of health insurance.”).
199. See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD Health Data
2008 - Frequently Requested Data, at Total health expenditure per capita, US$ purchasing
power parity, June 2008, at www.oecd.org/document/16/0,3343,en_2649_34631_
2085200_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2009) [hereinafter OECD Health Data]; see
also Couchepin Interview, supra note 85.
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$4,311 per capita, and the U.K. spent just $2,760 per capita!200 Despite
much higher spending, however, the U.S. still ranks last in many key quality
indicators among other industrialized countries.201
Most proposed universal healthcare plans aim to provide healthcare
coverage to all citizens while simultaneously reducing healthcare costs.
These goals are important especially with regard to the pharmaceutical
industry, as reducing pharmaceutical costs is a vital step toward reducing
overall spending. An element common to both the proposed American
plans and the Swiss system is a focus on using generic drugs. Additionally,
many proposed American plans demand that the Secretary of HHS be able
to negotiate Medicare drug prices with the pharmaceutical industry. This
could be a way to implement some government influence over drug prices
without taking away all American capitalist spirit by allowing the government
to control prices directly, as is the case in Switzerland. By focusing on
generic drugs and allowing the Secretary of HHS to negotiate with the
pharmaceutical companies, pharmaceutical manufacturers will have a
stronger incentive to keep costs low so they can effectively compete with
generic drug companies and generate profits in the face of likely lower
negotiated drug prices. These changes could significantly impact the
pharmaceutical industry’s willingness to comply with federal regulations
concerning off-label promotion. Given that there is a fair amount of
disregard for such restrictions now, due to the high cost of post-market
testing and after-market approval cost, as well as the short amount of time
to enjoy patent protection, new measures which focus on generics could
give pharmaceutical companies more incentive to get as much return on
their investments as possible.
In addition to spending substantially more on healthcare as a whole, the
United States also spent almost twice as much as Switzerland on
pharmaceuticals in 2005, and, once again, more than any other
organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
country.202 While expenditure on pharmaceuticals as a percentage of total
healthcare spending is substantially lower in the U.S. than it is in other
countries, this is only because the U.S. spends considerably more on
200. OECD Health Data, supra note 199.
201. Despite Spending More, U.S. Ranks Last in Several Key Health Indicators, Study Finds,
12 Health Care Daily Rep. (BNA) No. 93, at Lead Report (May 15, 2007).
202. OECD Health Data, supra note 199. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) is a multinational organization of 30 democratic, capitalist
countries which coordinates efforts to sustain economic growth among its members. The
United States, Switzerland and the United Kingdom are all members of the OECD. See
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, About OECD, at
http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_36734103_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last
visited Jan. 6, 2009).
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healthcare overall.203 It appears that the high rate of spending on drugs in
the U.S. correlates to a higher rate of per capita spending on healthcare,
therefore implying that in order to cut the overall cost of healthcare,
spending on drugs will also need to be cut. As the Layzer case
demonstrates, the cost of drugs used off-label can be substantial, and the
fact that Ms. Layzer’s drugs are not covered by Medicare Part D could be an
indication that the idea already exists in the United States that some costs
are just not justified.204
Further support that this idea is not a new concept in the U.S. is found in
the fact that most American universal healthcare proposals would set up an
independent national agency or institute to ensure effectiveness and quality,
similar to the role of NICE in the U.K. While the U.K. model demonstrates
that an agency that focuses on comparative effectiveness of alternative
treatments could have the effect in the U.S. of shifting the off-label question
away from whether an off-label use is safe and effective to whether such a
use is too costly, this common thread between all three candidate proposals
suggests that a centralized agency similar to NICE is likely to become a
fixture of any American universal healthcare system, along with the
accompanying focus on cost-effectiveness.
Additionally, under the healthcare structure in Switzerland, insurance
companies are forced to compete with each other because the government
believes that, in a strong capitalist society, “if there is competition between
the health insurance companies, there will be a certain control among
themselves; they will denounce the excesses of the others, . . . and also they
will try to provide better services, and so you can compare” the plans
offered by each company.205 The Swiss government directly rejects a single
payer insurance system because it believes in the capitalist ideal that
competition improves quality.206 One proposal for an American universal
system would prefer to pool purchasing power for drugs, similar to the way
PDPs work under Medicare Part D.207 As discussed supra, the fact that PDPs
are provided by private insurance companies that make bids to HHS seems
to be related to a more limited coverage rate of off-label drugs.208 While
pooling purchasing power in such a way may lead to improved economies
203. Id. at Pharmaceutical expenditure, % expenditure on health.
204. Complaint at 1-4, Judith M. Layzer & Ray J. Fischer v. Michael O. Leavitt, No. 07CV-11339 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2007).
205. Couchepin Interview, supra note 85.
206. Id.
207. Edwards Plan, supra note 179, at Universal Coverage Through Shared Responsibility;
see FURROW ET AL., supra note 93, at 782, 784 (discussing how the country is split into thirtyfour PDP regions, where competing PDPs bid to cover the region; also, PDPs have the ability
to negotiate with drug manufacturers over drug prices).
208. FURROW ET AL., supra note 93, at 782.
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of scale, the Swiss system has established that competition creates better
choices for consumers, an idea which would likely also imply a better
selection of off-label drugs. By combining purchasing pools with stricter
regulation of the pharmaceutical industry, the outcome would likely be a
lower rate of coverage for off-label drug use.
VI. CONCLUSION
Current proposals for universal healthcare in the United States and
European healthcare system models demonstrate that cost is and will
continue to be a primary concern for healthcare policymakers. While
quality remains an important consideration, universal healthcare remains a
lesson in basic economics, where a scarce supply of resources must be
rationed among an endless demand for services.209 Both the British and
Swiss healthcare models contain elements of cost-effectiveness, and both
have definitive measures in place to help control the cost of drugs. This is
not to suggest that cost is the only concern, however, since one of the
primary issues with off-label use is whether the off-label use is well
supported by clinical studies that would demonstrate that the product is safe.
Despite the focus on cost-effectiveness, all models and proposals discussed
designate quality of care as a primary goal. Therefore, even if off-label
drugs may be better at treating certain problems or patient groups, the fact
that the off-label use is essentially experimental may imply that expensive
off-label drugs could be excluded from coverage on the grounds of both
cost and safety.
Indeed, in the U.S., the Medicaid model seems to focus less on costeffectiveness and more on being able to provide safe treatment to
beneficiaries. However, Medicaid budgeting varies so much from state-tostate that it is hard to draw any firm conclusions about Medicaid decisionmaking across the country.210 In contrast, the fact that Medicare Part D
offers less coverage than Part B may reflect how the high level of
prescription drug spending in the United States was considered when
Congress determined whether the Secretary of HHS would have the ability to
expand the compendia with peer-reviewed literature.

209. See R. Douglas Scott, II et al., Applying Economic Principles to Health Care, 7
EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES (SPECIAL ISSUE) 282 (2001) (noting that "the basic problem
addressed by economics is how to allocate limited resources among unlimited demands.").
210. See, e.g., The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Medicaid Cost Containment Actions
Taken by States, FY 2008, at www.statehealthfacts.org/comparetable.jsp?ind=187&cat=4
(last visited Jan. 3, 2009); see also The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Positive Medicaid
Policy Actions Taken by States, FY 2008, at www.statehealthfacts.org/comparetable.jsp?ind
=190&cat=4 (last visited Jan. 3, 2009) (both tables demonstrate the variety of ways that
states have constructed their Medicaid programs).
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Ultimately, the FDA is unlikely to prohibit off-label use altogether. A
complete prohibition would involve regulating the practice of doctors which
the FDA has repeatedly said that it will not do. Unless there is a significant
crackdown on off-label promotion, any restrictions on pharmaceutical
companies’ profits is likely to give those companies stronger incentives to
promote off-label use as a means of recouping the significant capital that is
invested in drug development. However, an important question that
remains unanswered is how any potential universal healthcare system will
cover such drugs. Under the proposed plans that allow people to retain
their private insurance plans, and for the people that will remain covered by
Medicare and Medicaid, coverage might not change much in the shortterm—some off-label uses will continue to be covered as long as
manufacturers can establish that such uses are safe. As time goes on,
however, and financial support for Medicare and Medicaid strains to
support everyone covered by the two programs, it is quite possible that the
determination of coverage for an off-label use will depend on more than
just whether that off-label use is safe. In the future, with respect to Medicare
and Medicaid reimbursement, or in the context of a newly created national
health care system, the debate over off-label drug use is likely to switch from
whether an off-label use is safe to whether that use is cost-effective. As the
debate shifts, the opinions of healthcare providers as to what is best for their
patients may not change, but whether those opinions align with what payors
are willing to cover may eventually shape a new debate—one in which the
question is how much is too much to pay, no matter how great the benefits.
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